

REASSESSING THE BUREAUCRATIC DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: A CASE STUDY OF THE CUBAN SUGAR QUOTA DECISION, 1954-56

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A case study of the Cuban sugar quota decision of 1954-56 tests the utility of the bureaucratic politics model for analyzing foreign economic policy issues. Four other models — presidential politics, organizational process, congressional behavior, and interest group activity — are used to assess the importance of nonbureaucratic factors in the decision-making process. Of all the models surveyed, bureaucratic politics is the most useful for understanding the final decision, but no single model fully explains the outcome.

One of the most important developments during the past two decades in the study of foreign policy decision making has been the growing popularity of the "bureaucratic politics" conceptual model as an analytical tool. Essentially, the model assumes that a nation's foreign policies are derived primarily from intragovernmental negotiations and bargaining rather than from systemic factors, extragovernmental sources, or foreign stimuli. Within the foreign affairs bureaucracy, differing institutional perspectives account for different policy stances, and, inasmuch as political power is fragmented, bargaining is inevitable on complex policy issues as a means of reconciling different views or reaching compromise among a variety of actors. Effectiveness in bargaining is important, and therefore each player seeks sources of influence, which will not only help to produce desirable outcomes, but will also help to enhance the organizational interests he represents. All this bargaining, or pulling and hauling, constitutes a po-

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litical process that produces policy outcomes (Neustadt, 1960; Huntington, 1961; Allison, 1971; Allison and Halperin, 1972; Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter, 1974).

There is general agreement among scholars and analysts that the bureaucratic politics model has explanatory utility, but no consensus on how much. The model has been criticized on various grounds. Some critics contend, for example, that values and/or cognitive "mind-sets" are more important than an official's position in the bureaucratic structure in determining his attitude toward policy. Others claim that it gives inadequate attention to nonbureaucratic variables such as the role of the public, interest groups, and Congress in the formulation and execution of foreign policy, or that it ignores the power of the "political center" — the Presidency — in organizing and directing the process of policy formation. Finally, some writers suggest that its central propositions have been lifted from organizational theory of the firm and may not be applicable to decision making in government (Krasner, 1972; Art, 1973; Freedman, 1976; Caldwell, 1977).

Whatever its explanatory power, there are a number of problems connected with the use of the model as an analytical method. First, it requires the analyst to concentrate almost exclusively on the intra-governmental variable, while holding constant all others, including domestic politics and international events. Consequently, predictive power is neither very high nor particularly reliable. Second, bureaucratic politics analysis relies on the case study technique as a basic methodology, but case studies demand a quantity and quality of data rarely available outside of government, especially for the post-1950 period. Moreover, no systematic effort has been made to analyze cases dating prior to 1950, thereby precluding any determination of the model's historical validity. Finally, bureaucratic politics has been used in a relatively limited number of case studies dealing with an even smaller number of issue areas (Caldwell, 1977:2; Art, 1973:484-86).

This study of the politics of the sugar quota in United States-Cuban relations during the mid-1950s seeks to answer the following three interrelated questions: (1) how useful is bureaucratic politics for analyzing noncrisis foreign economic policy issues, (2) how controlling is the outcome of bargaining in the executive branch when congressional and interest group variables are added to the equation, and (3) what is the relative weight of such nonbureaucratic factors in foreign policy decision making? If this study yields meaningful results, it should provide additional evidence concerning the analytical value of the bureaucratic politics model and also facilitate the development of a foreign policy issue-area typology. Why did I select this particular issue? Sugar acts are fundamentally domestic term legislation, but their foreign quota provisions constitute a clear and significant foreign policy component easily isolated for analysis. The periodic struggle over quota provisions engaged all levels of the foreign affairs bureaucracy, as well

as legislative and extragovernmental actors. Moreover, sugar is a non-crisis issue with little inherent centralizing thrust toward the White House. Finally, there is available a sufficient quantity of high quality data to permit extensive analysis of the executive, legislative, and public areas.

Between 1934 and 1974, a complex sugar control system prevailed in the United States. This system attacked the problem of declining sugar prices and the noncompetitive position of the United States producers by restricting foreign suppliers under statutory quotas, and by providing direct subsidy payments to domestic growers. Under the program, the Secretary of Agriculture annually set an aggregate quota based on his estimate of the country's consumption requirements. Annual marketing quotas for the various domestic and foreign producing areas were prescribed in successive pieces of legislation. The tariff duty levied on imported raw sugar was low, but tariff reduction was offset by import quotas. A low excise tax was collected on all raw sugar processed. From this revenue, all domestic and insular producers (Hawaii, Puerto Rico, etc.), were subsidized, subject to their conforming to minimum labor standards for their field workers. If necessary, domestic quotas were enforced through acreage allotments to both cane and beet growers (Johnson, 1974; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Agriculture, 1971).

Within this system, until 1960 when Cuba lost its quota privilege, the United States and Cuba had a symbiotic relationship. The sugar program introduced in the 1930s, devised in part to rescue Cuba from economic and political collapse (Benjamin, 1977), gave that country a guaranteed, relatively stable market in which to sell its primary export at prices generally higher than the world price. With this advantage, Cuba enjoyed relative economic prosperity, but it also had to contend with certain economic risks. Since statutory quotas protected domestic producers against downward adjustments, all major risks of change in net import requirements fell on Cuba. In addition, domestic beet production tended to rise when other farm product prices were weak, and to decline when other farm prices were strong. Consequently, domestic sugar output displaced less Cuban sugar in prosperous times and more in bad times, when total U.S. requirements were also depressed. Nevertheless, Cuba always served as the major foreign supplier to the United States market, irrespective of fluctuations in demand, largely because of preferential arrangements between the two countries (Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, 1954:207-10).

Bargaining in the Executive Arena

In January 1955, the representatives of the domestic sugar industry, faced with heavy surplus carryovers from 1952 to 1954, were deter-

mined to revise the Sugar Act² to secure a quota increase and a percentage of the quota assigned to foreign suppliers. They successfully appealed to the Department of Agriculture to intercede with the White House, and on 21 January Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson wrote to the President, requesting new sugar legislation (U.S. Department of State, 21 January 1955a: File 811.235/1-2155). After testing the views of 28 senators and congressmen and industry leaders at a meeting on sugar, the White House released a statement calling for the "immediate revision" of the Act and indicating that Secretary Benson would have the "leadership" in assigning quotas. Concerned that this signified encroachment on its prerogatives, State sought clarification. In a memorandum to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the President confirmed the principle that responsibility for sugar legislation was a two-department proposition and that he favored new legislation only when the present Act expired (U.S. Department of State, 17 February 1955: File 811.235/2-1755). Although this pacified State, it did not reconcile the differing interpretations held by the two departments concerning the President's position.

Beginning in February, however, State and Agriculture officials attempted to achieve a common front on sugar legislation before going to Congress. Initially, they agreed on the principle of sharing increases in consumption over a base figure between domestic growers and foreign suppliers, and the introduction of legislation in the current session of Congress, but they disagreed on almost everything else. State's policymakers wanted the prospective legislation to contain provisions disallowing any increase in the basic quota for domestic producers, sharing in consumption increases over a base figure of 8.5 million tons, with sharing on the basis of a 50/50 division between domestic producers and foreign suppliers, and continuation of the current method of reallocating domestic deficits, a portion of which went to Cuba. They were willing to consider legislation effective prior to the expiration of the existing Act, provided that Agriculture agreed to support a veto of legislation less favorable to foreign suppliers than that on which the two departments decided. On the other hand, Agriculture's officials favored revision of the Act to provide relief for the domestic industry in 1955, sharing of consumption increases over a base level of 8.3 million tons, and a 55/45 percent division between domestic growers and foreign suppliers. The thrust of State's bargaining position was, in effect, to prevent legislation that would reduce foreign participation absolutely in the United States market or introduce retroactive changes in the Act, whereas Agriculture was willing to undertake sub-

²The Sugar Act was extended and amended in the following years after its initial passage in 1934: 1937, 1948, 1952, 1956, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1965, and 1971. Under the Sugar Act of 1948, quotas were *fixed* for domestic areas and the Philippines, all variable quantities were assigned to Cuba and the full duty countries (foreign producing areas other than Cuba and the Philippines which paid full import duty rates on raw sugar). In the early 1950s, domestic producers wanted to revert to percentage quotas which had been part of the act between 1934 and 1948. The Sugar Act of 1948, amended and extended in 1951, was the controlling legislation during the 1950s.

stantial adjustments in the foreign sector to achieve relief for the domestic industry (U.S. Department of State, 2 February 1955: File 811.235/2-255).

In bargaining with Agriculture over the sugar issue, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry F. Holland served as State's chief negotiator. He regarded the sugar industry as inefficient in the United States, and the price support program for sugar as unrealistic in relation to price supports for other commodities. He defended the retention of the existing Act for its full term on the grounds that it was a moral obligation to Cuba, violation of which would erode United States credibility abroad and endanger Cuban support on a variety of issues important to the United States in international organizations. His hard-line position was constrained to some extent, however, by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Samuel Waugh and his subordinates in the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Waugh did not want to alienate Agriculture because State needed Agriculture's support on the issue of the disposal of agricultural surpluses, and he wanted to contain any negative spillover from the sugar issue to commodity policy in general. Therefore, he favored a more flexible approach and appeared more receptive to Agriculture's claim that denying early relief to domestic sugar growers would cause political difficulties for the President, but Holland had the support of Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. (U.S. Department of State, 26 March 1955: File 811.235/3-2655).

Agriculture officials viewed the sugar quota issue from a very different organizational context. Line responsibility for sugar legislation was vested in the Sugar Division, under Lawrence Meyers. He enjoyed the full support of the department's senior staff, one or more of whom was present during every important meeting with State. Moreover, Agriculture was apparently free from internal divisions over the sugar issue, and it could generally count on support from its sugar constituency and its allies in Congress. Agriculture officials hoped their position would satisfy the industry, and not offend Senator William Ellender, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, a strong proponent of early relief for the domestic sugar industry, and a "key man in the fight to retain flexible price supports." (U.S. Department of State, 16 March 1955: File 811.235/3-1655). They were also concerned about the broader political implications of discontent arising among the nation's beet farmers over declining farm income, with a presidential election only a year and a half away.

By early April the two departments were completely deadlocked, and this motivated Hoover to try to resolve the issue directly with Benson. Benson's firm commitment to Agriculture's proposals and his insistence on an 8.3 million ton base figure impressed Hoover and led to retreat in the State Department. In explaining the turn of events to Ambassador Arthur L. Gardner in Cuba, Holland stated that "the President's advisers at the White House have informed us that because of domestic political considerations they believe that something must be done this year to give domestic sugar producers some relief," and

"therefore we regard ourselves as virtually under a White House directive to reach agreement with the Department of Agriculture on sugar legislation to be submitted during the present session of Congress" (U.S. Department of State, 5 May 1955: File 837.235/5-555). Nevertheless, Hoover, Holland, and Waugh agreed that State had to attempt to contain the damage, by resisting any changes in the Sugar Act effective prior to 1 January 1956, and exploring alternative uses for sugar under foreign assistance or government purchase programs.

By May, the White House began to play an increasingly active role in executive branch deliberations on the sugar issue. Throughout February and March, the President's chief advisers on sugar, Gabriel Hauge and Sherman Adams, had been reluctant to place the sugar issue before him unless it proved impossible to reach a decision any other way (U.S. Department of State, 29 March, 1955: File 811.235/3-2955; 31 March 1955: File 811.235/3-3155). As State and Agriculture proved incapable of reaching a compromise, White House interest grew, especially as pressure mounted among industry leaders and their allies in Congress for early hearings on a sugar bill. On 19 May the White House weighed in with general guidelines for sugar legislation. The President agreed to have sugar legislation enacted in 1955, providing that proposed changes did not become effective until 1956. He also wanted hearings initiated in the House in time for full consideration there and in the Senate by July, and a unified administration position providing relief for domestic producers. Specifically, the White House indicated it could support the sharing principle on a 50/50 basis at 8.35 million tons, and a domestic purchase program of possibly 100,000 tons meeting Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) requirements (U.S. Department of State, 19 May 1955: File 811.235/5-1955).

Working within these guidelines, Hoover and Under Secretary of Agriculture True D. Morse reached agreement on a compromise position early in June, which they presented to a legislative leaders' meeting at the White House on 8 June. The only significant departures from White House proposals were provisions for enacting legislation in 1955 that would increase the domestic crop quota for 1956, and for dividing future market growth on the basis of 55 percent for domestic producers and 45 percent for foreign suppliers, with 96 percent of the foreign share reserved for Cuba. Those present at the meeting regarded the Hoover-Morse proposals as the "most reasonable compromise" on the sugar issue, but Morse pointed out that unfortunately that meant everybody affected would be unhappy. He was right. Even the President had misgivings. He stated that he had "agreed to a 1955 submission of new legislation because of the intense interests of American sugar producers, and because the submission of legislation would not in itself modify the existing legislation to run through 1956. He wanted it made clear that the additional proposal of changing the 1956 in the course of action on the new legislation was something that went beyond anything he had agreed to" (White House, 8 June 1955: Eisenhower Library, Legislative Leaders Meeting File).

The Legislative Arena

After the executive branch reached a decision, it had to implement it in Congress, where sugar bills were already in committee. In the House of Representatives, the Committee on Agriculture played a key role in sugar legislation. Sugar legislation was revenue producing, and always originated in the House, where Committee Chairman Harold D. Cooley (D-N.C.) controlled the balance of decision-making power. The Committee's dealings with State were minimal, but it had a close connection with Agriculture, because Agriculture had to negotiate with the Committee on a wide range of farm and agricultural issues. Potentially, at least, the House Committee possessed considerably more retaliatory leverage than the Senate Finance Committee, under Harry F. Byrd (D-Va.), which handled sugar bills in the Senate. Sugar was marginal to the Finance Committee's normal area of jurisdiction, and its chairman represented a state without a significant sugar constituency.

Cooley derived his power from two main sources, one tactical and the other constitutional in origin. He could delay action on proposed sugar legislation until late in a congressional session or until shortly before the scheduled expiration of existing legislation, thereby building up pressure behind new legislation. Parliamentary rules also worked in his favor. Unlike bills involving all other commodities, sugar legislation was screened by the whole Agriculture Committee, rather than a subcommittee. This procedure gave Cooley leverage as chairman, since members of the Committee were less likely to disagree with him, in order to maintain his support on other legislation in which they were interested. Thus, tactical advantage combined with parliamentary rules enabled Cooley to wield considerable influence over the fate of sugar legislation (Jones, 1961:358-67; Berman and Heineman, 1963; Price, 1971:212-32).

During the spring of 1955, while State and Agriculture officials bargained over the sugar quota issue, Cooley delayed hearings on the ground that the President did not want the Sugar Act changed before it expired. It was clear, however, that he used the hearings to obtain support from his colleagues for 90 percent parity legislation on key agricultural commodities such as tobacco, that was logjammed in committee. By May, representatives of the sugar industry were pressing hard for hearings, but Cooley did not change his position until Senator Ellender agreed to have 90 percent of parity price support legislation reported out of committee. When the news reached him, Cooley set hearings for June (U.S. Department of State, 2 May 1955: File 811.235/5-255; 12 May 1955: File 811.235/5-1255).

The administration's first objective in Congress, once hearings were set, was to modify H.R. 5406, the sugar bill introduced by Congressman Clifford R. Hope (R-Kans.) in March. At the hearings, which opened on 22 June, Morse, Holland, and Meyers presented testimony for the administration, making it clear that they were united with re-

spect to the bill's provisions. Holland told the Committee that the State Department could not support an effective date for new sugar legislation earlier than 1 January 1956, a base figure lower than 8.35 million tons from which to measure consumption increases, or any change in the current method of allocating quotas among foreign suppliers until 1 January 1957. He warned that any more drastic curtailment of Cuba's share of the United States market than that recommended by the administration would result in substantial loss of trade for a pro-United States government, and deterioration of the island's economy that the communists could easily exploit. Cooley described Holland's presentation as a "veto message," since none of the 30 bills submitted to his Committee came close to what the administration wanted (U.S. Congress, House Committee on Agriculture, 1955:11-20).

By the end of June the administration prepared its own proposals as draft legislation, and Cooley agreed to introduce the bill (H.R. 7030) as a substitute for H.R. 5406. Cooley, however, was not entirely happy with the substitute bill, and he tried to persuade State and Agriculture officials to make changes. First, he wanted to hold Cuba's quota to the level it would have reached under existing legislation and to increase the quotas for full duty countries up to 100,000 tons more than the administration had recommended. He also wanted the executive branch to accept a provision to restrict quota increases only to foreign countries that were members of the International Sugar Agreement as of 1 January 1957, or to reduce sugar quotas for any country failing to maintain its agricultural commodity imports from the United States at a level selected for certain representative years. Finally, he wanted the bill to contain authority for the government to make nonrecourse loans on sugar up to 90 percent of parity, in addition to any provision for the purchase of domestic sugar as surplus for use in the foreign aid program. Administration resistance to Cooley's proposals led him to describe State's attitude as "uncompromising," and he complained that apparently the administration expected Congress to "rubber stamp" its sugar bill. Cooley's consternation was only temporary, however, because when H.R. 7030 emerged from his committee, it contained most of the changes he desired. The House approved it on 30 July, but Congress adjourned on 2 August, without taking further action on the sugar bill (U.S. Department of State, 8 July 1955: File 811.235/7-855; 15 July 1955: File 811.235/7-1555; 18 July 1955: File 811.235/7-1855).

After Congress adjourned, State, Agriculture, and White House officials concerned with the sugar bill devised a three-fold strategy for obtaining bipartisan support for the administration's position. They concentrated their "political spadework" on the members of the Senate Finance Committee, to persuade those regarded as potential supporters to hold firm when the bill went into conference. If Finance Committee conferees refused to give ground, they believed, there was a good chance the House conferees would come around, because by that time the Cubans and their congressional allies would have had

ample opportunity to generate considerable pressure in the House (U.S. Department of State, 24 August 1955: File 811.318/8-2455; 30 September 1955: File 811.318/9-3055). Second, the administration forged a working alliance with Senator Wallace F. Bennett (R-Utah), who represented a sugar beet state and was up for reelection in 1956. He wanted to avoid a situation whereby Cuba would become so dissatisfied that its allies in Congress would try to block all sugar legislation until the present Act expired. When he wrote to Holland expressing concern over the fate of sugar legislation, Holland invited him to cooperate with the administration. From that point on, Bennett served as the executive branch's key ally in the Senate on sugar legislation (U.S. Department of State, 15 August 1955: File 811.235/8-455). The final element in the administration's strategy involved the use of the sugar purchase program as a lever to build support. In its general guidelines of 19 May the White House had endorsed the idea of domestic sugar purchases to help relieve the surplus, and by the late summer State and Agriculture officials were vigorously pursuing the idea with industry leaders.

Congress reconvened in January 1956, and H.R. 7030 was taken up by the Senate Finance Committee as S. 1635. On 16 January Morse, Holland, and Meyers again testified for the administration, stressing even more emphatically the negative impact that some of the bill's provisions would have on the Cuban economy and inter-American trade (U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, 1956b: *passim*). The combination of testimony and the pre-hearing activities by executive branch officials had an apparent impact. In reporting favorably on S. 1635, the Finance Committee substituted certain provisions of H.R. 7030 with changes closer to the administration's recommendations (U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, 1956a). The Senate passed the Finance Committee's amended version of H.R. 7030 by a voice vote on 8 February 1956.

The Senate and the House went into conference on the sugar bill in late February, but proceedings were postponed until May. When they resumed, the conferees agreed to the Senate bill's provisions regarding the division of consumption increases over a base level of 8.35 million tons. They bogged down on individual country quotas, however, particularly Cuba's, because of Cooley's apparent expectation that since the House conferees had conceded on consumption increases and the base level, the Senate conferees would accept the House bill's provisions on the distribution of foreign shares. State proposed a compromise, offered by Senator Bennett in the conference committee, to split the difference between the Senate and House figures for Cuba. Instead, they decided to increase Cuba's share at the expense of Peru. The final version of the conference committee's bill was approved by Congress on 17 May, and signed by the President on 29 May as the Sugar Act of 1956 (U.S. Department of State, 21 May 1956: File 811.235/5-2156). The new legislation extended the Sugar Act (P.L. 545)

for four years, retroactive to 1 January 1956. It raised the basic quota to 8.35 million tons and provided for the division of consumption growth over that figure at 55/45 percent between domestic growers and foreign suppliers. Relative shares among the foreign suppliers remained unchanged (96 percent to Cuba; 4 percent to others) through 1956, but thereafter Cuba's share was reduced to 29.59 percent (70 Stat. 217).

The Public Arena

It is clear from the preceding sections of this paper that the sugar interest groups played a role in the decision-making process. To clarify their role, however, it is necessary to analyze their activities from two perspectives: (1) as *actors* contending for influence, and (2) as entities *acted upon* by other actors in the political system.

Sugar Interest Groups as Actors. For the Cuban government, the struggle to obtain favorable treatment in sugar legislation was uphill. The Cubans resorted to a variety of activities to get their message across bureaucratic hurdles inside the United States: (1) periodic visits by ranking Cuban diplomats, often accompanied by representatives of the Cuba Sugar Stabilization Institute, to the Department of State, (2) enlistment of private groups based in Cuba, such as Rotary International and the United States Chamber of Commerce in Cuba, to sponsor and support public campaigns among its mainland counterparts in favor of the Cuban position, (3) recruitment of public relations and legal firms in the United States to spread the message that a drastic cut in Cuba's sugar quota would substantially decrease Cuban purchases in the North American market,³ (4) official protest against unfavorable sugar bills, and (5) veiled threats of retaliation through trade and foreign exchange restrictions. The Cuban government concentrated on the State Department, while its domestic allies, eastern refiners and members of the United States-Cuban Sugar Council, which represented thirteen large firms with sugar enterprises in Cuba, lobbied extensively on Capitol Hill.

The pro-Cuban sugar groups had three basic objectives. They favored retention of the existing Sugar Act until it expired, and they wanted to derail any effort to diminish Cuba's sugar position in new legislation and preferably to enhance that position. They failed, however, to prevent State's concessions to Agriculture during the pro-

³For example, the New York law firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly, and Ball utilized computers to develop a list, based on invoice data supplied by the Cuban government, of United States firms exporting more than \$100 worth of goods annually to Cuba. This group of exporters became the target of a mail campaign stressing the adverse impact upon the export trade of a cut in the Cuban sugar quota. In Senate testimony George Ball gave a detailed description of the operation (U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign Contributions, 1957:1117-36).

tracted period of bureaucratic bargaining. Their campaign among U.S. exporters generated a flow of letters to Congress, but the sugar industry's counter-campaign among farmers neutralized this. They may have been more successful in the Senate, but that is exceedingly difficult to demonstrate, inasmuch as they lobbied almost exclusively with known supporters. It is much more likely that the administration's strategy accounts for favorable Senate action.

In contrast to the pro-Cuban sugar groups, the domestic industry enjoyed a clear advantage in the public arena. It had an established relationship with the Department of Agriculture and important congressional committees and a strong political alliance in Congress. Although in general there were areas of potential conflict between the industry's various sectors,⁴ most groups shared a common view toward Cuban sugar. They had been willing to accept a large temporary increase in Cuba's quota during World War II. Between 1948 and 1955, however, domestic use of sugar increased about a million tons year, and most of the consumption growth went to Cuba. That country had eight years to adjust its production downward from the artificially high level of the early 1940s, but had increased it instead. Now that the new pattern of domestic demand had been established, the industry believed that the redistribution of consumption growth was not only necessary but long overdue. (U.S. Department of State, 21 January 1955b: File 811.235/1-2155; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Agriculture, 1955:167-72).

The sugar industry's principal point of contact with the administration was the Department of Agriculture's Sugar Division. When bargaining in the executive branch on the sugar issue delayed a decision on the shape of legislation, industry representatives attempted to strengthen Agriculture's hand by going to Congress. On 31 March 1955, the industry triggered the introduction into the House of Representatives nearly thirty identical sugar bills, one of which became H.R. 5406. The following day, 1 April, 48 Senators joined with Senator Allen Ellender in sponsoring revision of the existing Act in S. 1635. All of these bills, *inter alia*, provided for the redistribution of a substantial portion of consumption growth to domestic producers. Although the industry's tactic did not produce an immediate payoff, it helped to raise the stakes of continued bargaining in the administration (*Congressional Record*, 1955:4164; U.S. Department of State, 28 March 1955: File 811.235/3-2855).

⁴The sugar industry is comprised of three basic sectors: domestic producers (beet and cane), processors, and refiners form one unit; territorial producers form a second; and foreign producers, processors, and refiners make up the third. The largest areas of potential conflict are between domestic refiners who mill only cane and depend on imported raw sugar and the beet growers; territorial producers and domestic cane growers; and within the domestic refining group between "association" and "nonassociation" (independent refiners). Differences between the sectors are generally brokered through the mechanism of voluntary trade associations. Nevertheless, disagreements, particularly if intense, exert a divisive force within the industry and retard its ability to influence the policy process.

Sugar Interest Groups as the Target of Other Actors. During the period of bargaining in the executive branch, not only were State and Agriculture officials keenly aware of the activities of the sugar interest groups, but they also found ways to use them in the bargaining process. Agriculture officials, for example, in discussions with State and White House representatives stressed the clout of domestic producers in Congress and their ability to "put legislation through the Congress on their own terms whether the Administration liked it or not" (U.S. Department of State, 17 February 1955: File 811.235/2-1755). To counterbalance this, Assistant Secretary of State Holland forwarded to the White House reports from the Cuban Embassy describing the adverse impact a cut in the Cuban sugar quota would have on the island and summaries of mail received at the Department revealing the intensity of United States business support for the Cuban position (U.S. Department of State, 9 April 1955: File 837.235/4-955).

After the administration reached a decision on sugar quotas in June 1955, it turned its efforts toward achieving a consensus among industry leaders. Its most potent weapon in consensus building was the domestic sugar purchase program. On 20 October Hauge and other administration officials met with industry spokesmen to secure support for the Senate Finance Committee's sugar bill. He explained that the administration's proposals for new sugar legislation constituted a "package," and that it hoped to implement sugar purchase as an integral part of the package. The President's administrative assistant, I. Jack Martin, requested whatever assurance industry leaders could give that they would use their influence with key members of the House Agriculture Committee, particularly regarding provisions in the Senate bill dealing with the distribution of foreign shares. Industry spokesmen indicated that they were willing to support the administration's position on foreign shares, and White House officials agreed to work for early domestic purchase of surplus sugar. By the end of October the agreement was sealed, and the administration had its consensus (U.S. Department of State, 20 October 1955: File 811.235/10-2055; 14 December 1955: File 811.235/12-1455).

Expanding the Analysis

By definition the bureaucratic politics model of decision making in foreign policy focuses exclusively on the executive branch. Analysts who employ this model do not regard any single actor, even the President, as a predominant individual, though he may exert significant influence on a particular decision. They make no distinction between career and appointed officials, regardless of their proximity to or distance from the President, and they discount the importance of congressional and interest group activity. They see governmental action in the field of foreign policy as the result of pluralistic conflict, trade-offs, and consensus building among individual executive branch actors.

My analysis of the Cuban sugar quota issue, however, suggests at least five things: (1) noncrisis foreign policy issues frequently require the attention of the legislative branch, in the form of appropriations, enabling legislation, and other types of congressional activity, (2) issues do not spill over into the legislative branch in willy-nilly fashion, but rather because the Congress has a clear responsibility that the executive branch cannot circumvent, (3) an issue with domestic political and/or economic implications will stimulate affected interest groups to enter the public arena to press for additional benefits or to preserve those previously acquired, (4) the application of a strict bureaucratic politics approach to such issues will yield only a partial explanation of the decisional outcome, and (5) to achieve a fuller explanation the analyst must use other conceptual approaches. In the following paragraphs, I expand my analysis by briefly assessing the evidence from the perspective of four other conceptual approaches: organizational process, presidential politics, congressional behavior, and interest group politics.

Organizational Process. This approach, formulated by Allison (1968, 1969) and often referred to as "Allison's model II," views decisions as outputs of large organizations, or their components, functioning according to standard patterns of behavior. Each organization has a core mission, and issues are perceived in terms of that mission. Few issues fall exclusively into the domain of a single organization, but in general organizations recognize each other's mission. They attempt to serve these missions through definable routines, or "repertoires," which are responsible for producing outcomes. Formal choice by leaders of the organization is virtually anticlimactic, although leaders can intervene to disrupt temporarily the operation of routines.

The organizational process approach to decision making is particularly useful in explaining routine executionary activity (Allison, 1968:57). The Cuban sugar quota issues falls into this category. When raised, it triggered standard routines in both State and Agriculture for handling the issue. State recognized Agriculture's major responsibility for domestic sugar legislation, and Agriculture deferred to State on foreign policy aspects of quota provisions. Each, however, had its respective organizational mission to pursue. State wanted to: (1) maintain the international economic system free from disjunctions and conflict, (2) support the national interest against more narrowly conceived domestic interests, and (3) defend the principal of economic concession in general as a useful tool of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Agriculture sought to: (1) protect the domestic economy from economic dislocation caused by external forces, (2) reconcile domestic interests with the national interest, and (3) maintain intact the system of congressional alliances established over many years. The two organizations also *shared* certain interests. They both had an enormous stake in the maintenance of the sugar control system, which in turn required them to share the goal of producer protection. This represented an important mutual constraint, and dramatically reduced the scope of conflict

between them. Nevertheless, resolution of the sugar quota issue required the intervention of the President, whose general guidelines ultimately enabled organizational routines to produce a decision.

Presidential Politics. In this approach, the role of the President is regarded as the critical factor in determining the decision-making structure and the bureaucratic outcome. Crisis issues and national security problems require the highest level of presidential attention and involvement, but this does not mean that presidential preferences fail to restrain executive branch actors who deal with noncrisis foreign economic policy issues. The President's staff and Cabinet members are selected to represent and implement presidential preferences. He establishes the rules of the game, determines access, and can adopt a variety of strategies to achieve results (Ball, 1974; Perlmutter, 1974; Krasner, 1972; Rourke, 1972; Hilsman, 1971; Rosati, 1981:245-50). Not all issues reach the President, but the common denominator of those that do is conflict, either between individuals or organizational units (Sorenson, 1963).

Eisenhower's role in the Cuban sugar quota issue reflected his presidential strategy. Whenever possible, he delegated general policies to his subordinates, and gave them wide discretionary latitude for resolving problems, especially in controversial cases. This permitted him to assume the position of a national leader above the spoils of politics. He followed this strategy in the sugar quota case, allowing bureaucratic actors to absorb the criticism for delay when the bargaining became protracted. On 19 May 1955, he stepped forward to resolve the bureaucratic struggle, thereby reaping whatever political advantages were associated with reaching a decision. Once the President weighed in with general guidelines, the bureaucratic players reached a compromise quickly. They were quite willing to bargain against each other, but not to challenge the President, because there is simply no alternative to the presidential center. Resolution of the bureaucratic issue enabled the bureaucracy to unify as it turned to face Congress, thereby strengthening its position. The President's effectiveness was determined not by his assertiveness or dominance, but by his adroitness in choosing the time and the manner of intervening in the bureaucratic struggle (Neustadt, 1960: 179-80).

Congressional Behavior. Once the executive branch produces a decision that requires congressional attention, the White House is committed to investing its resources to achieve a compatible outcome in Congress. Congress responds to the issue, however, not as a unitary actor but as a congeries of interests, both individual and group. Individual congressmen are motivated by three basic goals: (1) desire for reelection, (2) achievement of influence in their respective chamber, and (3) making good public policy. If a congressman strongly values reelection, he will attempt to disaggregate policy issues in or-

der to seek particularized benefits for his constituents, and claim responsibility for those benefits (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1973). In general, this results in a highly individualistic, narrow, short-term outlook that favors domestic interests over foreign policy interests, but facilitates the process whereby the executive branch engages in coalition building and trade-offs to achieve its objectives (Carroll, 1966; Dahl, 1964; Robinson, 1967). This tends to support the traditional view that the President and the executive branch exert real leadership in foreign policy, against the view that Congress plays an independent and sometimes assertive role (Franck and Weisband, 1979; Pastor, 1980; Edwards, 1980).

As clearly demonstrated in the Cuban sugar quota case, the executive branch derived considerable leverage from the fragmentation of Congress. The executive branch had a variety of levers to achieve a favorable outcome in Congress. It worked with the Agriculture Committee as a group, and individuals like Cooley in the House or Bennett in the Senate. It offered incentives that congressmen perceived as particularized benefits, in the form of a sugar purchase program. In fact, it always had the option of dealing with individuals, committees, or groups of representatives that cut across traditional party, geographic, or ideological lines. In this study, it is clear that the Congress did not participate as a unitary actor, and that the executive branch actors obviously did not perceive it that way.

Interest Group Politics. Like congressional behavior, interest group activity has generated many different conceptual approaches. The classic Schattschneider (1938) model that views foreign policy as the direct outcome of special interest group pressures was largely displaced by the Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1972) model that regards interest groups as generally ineffective and congressmen as individual actors who select the issues to which they prefer to respond. In his threefold typology of policies as either distributive, regulative, or redistributive, Lowi (1964) advanced interest group theory beyond a mechanistic conception of pressure politics by suggesting that analysts could interpret cases by issue type and evaluate outcomes in terms of distribution of benefits. Hayes (1978) further refined the Lowi typology and pointed out that congressmen respond differently to interest group efforts to influence policy in isolation than when they encounter resistance. Unopposed groups, he suggests, often represent the de facto constituency for most congressmen. Where no opposition is encountered, electoral incentives operate to encourage specific allocation of benefits. This constitutes the "politics of distribution."

Until 1974, the sugar quota issue qualified as pure distributive politics, where widespread benefits were made possible by the exclusion of certain potential actors. For sugar interests in 1954-56, the public arena was one of consensual demand; all parties wanted benefits. Sugar is a growth market, and the interest groups were fundamentally

concerned with how the growth was managed and distributed. Theoretically, none of the groups had to lose anything in this arena, because there was little countervailing pressure, and they could pass off any losses to unorganized and nonparticipating groups such as consumers. The sugar groups drew benefits less from each other than they did from inactive participants. A particular group may not have gained as large a quota increase as it sought, for example, but so long as it did not suffer an absolute diminution of benefits previously received, it experienced no real loss.

Studies of interest groups in foreign policy focus almost invariably on their attempts to influence legislators or policymakers. Rarely do analysts turn the telescope around to peer in the other end. It is essential, however, to know how executive branch power is used, for instance, to secure consensus in the public arena, if one wants to understand the impact of external variables on the decision-making process. In the sugar quota case, State and Agriculture officials perceived the interest groups primarily as prospective levers in their effort to bargain an outcome on the issue. Agriculture's concern about the "political strength" of the sugar industry was more a bargaining chip than it was a depiction of reality. Once the executive branch reached a decision, it then attempted to use the interest groups as a lever to influence the outcome in Congress. The presence of interest groups on one side, both sides, or all sides of particular issue, affords executive and legislative branch actors significant potential leverage. It does not suggest that the public arena is the critical locus for explaining foreign policy decisions.

Conclusion

In this study of the Cuban sugar quota decision of 1954-56, bureaucratic politics proved the most useful model for understanding the decision-making process, largely because bureaucratic actors defined the parameters of the issue. Each of the other models also shed helpful light on that process, particularly the nonbureaucratic aspects. It is very clear, however, that no single model could fully explain the ultimate outcome. In foreign economic policy, where the executive branch does not enjoy the kind of "natural monopoly" it has in national security affairs, achieving full understanding of decision making requires a multiple-model approach. Bureaucratic politics provides an excellent focus for this type of analysis. The most significant finding here is not that bureaucratic politics had certain limitations in this case or that one model had greater utility than another, but that there is a real need for a broader, integrated political systems approach to foreign policy decision making.

Analysts have paid far too much attention to crisis issues and crisis management, and far too little to noncrisis decisions outside of the field of national security policy. They have forgotten the cautionary

note sounded by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962:4) two decades ago that crisis decisions may be "atypically representative of determinants of choices and actions," and that lower level decisions "may in the end have more impact on the general directions of policy." Instead of concentrating on increasingly minute facets of the President's responsibility for crisis management, it is time for social scientists to develop an integrated political systems approach to foreign policy decision making that considers at least the interplay between the White House and the bureaucracy, the executive branch and Congress, individual congressmen and committees, interest groups, foreign policy considerations as they compete with domestic interests, and electoral considerations. Perhaps this will lead not only to a greater understanding of the decision-making process, but the whole structure of foreign policy.

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